“Boycott Course Evaluations”

Law Street Journal Article (December 3, 1990)

By Randol Schoenberg

Thanks to the single-handed volunteer efforts of Phil Albert, second and third year students could register for courses last week with at least a slight idea of what they were getting themselves into. Although the Course Guide suffered from an extremely low response rate, it was able to provide at least some of the information which we all find essential. What type of a class is this? Does the professor call on students? Was the final fair? Were the students’ comments favorable?

Phil went to a lot of trouble putting together the guide, but he shouldn’t have had to. Every semester we students fill out long course evaluations before taking our finals. We are asked to measure our professors and their courses on an inane numerical scale which is weighted toward positive responses, and if we really feel like it, we are encouraged to add our own comments. What happens to these course evaluations?

Last month Dean Bice came to speak to the SBA in response to their request that student course evaluation results be made available for course selection purposes. Bice denied the request without discussion, as he has in the past, but felt compelled to explain in person why he will not release the statistics.

For over fifteen years the faculty has handed out the Scantron course evaluations and used them for performance review. The results are tabulated and shown to each professor individually. Professors also get a list of unidentified scores for all courses so they can see where they sand in relation to others.

The Dean says that he uses the evaluation statistics for judging part-time faculty, determining merit salary increases, promotion and tenure decisions. He also emphasized the impact of the comments on young faculty members, most of whom come to USC with little teaching experience and suffer from poor evaluations early in their careers. The Dean says that he reviews the comments and may make suggestions to new professors on how to improve their teaching style.

All that is well and good, but so far there is no reason not to disclose the results to students. But Bice feels—apparently very strongly—that publication of the evaluation results would embarrass some faculty members. For that reason alone he opposes any disclosure of the student course evaluations. He also expressed disapproval of the student Course Guides from last year. “I cringed when I saw it last year,” he said, “I really felt badly about some of the comments.”

Bice would rather protect the hurt feelings of bad teachers than let students have reliable information on which to base their course selection decisions. There is no doubt that students want evaluation materials. No one likes to pick a course blindly, and word of mouth often isn’t enough. Bice told the SBA that he felt the course descriptions in the student handbook were enough, but that he would be glad to provide more information so long as it wasn’t “an evaluation.” What is wrong with evaluations?

Bice compared the evaluations to grades. Students would not want their grades publicly disclosed, why should teachers? But students do have to disclose their grades in order to get a job.  Sure, if we had the power we could band together and all refuse to disclose our grades to employers, but we don’t have that power. Bice and the faculty think they have the power to withhold the information we want.

The problem is that Bice needs students to complete the evaluations. He uses those evaluations.   He wants them. If we refuse to fill them out, he is stuck. We have the right to course evaluation statistics. After all, we are the ones who provide all the information. If we want the results, we should have them. And if we aren’t given the results, we should refuse to contribute the evaluations.

Because of Dean Bice’s adamant refusal to allow the disclosure of the information we provide, the Law Street Journal is calling for a school-wide boycott of course evaluations for this finals period. Unless Bice consents to release the evaluation statistics, he should not have any statistics. Unless he changes his mind, all students should refuse to fill out the course evaluation forms.

Many students already neglect to fill out the forms before taking their final. It shouldn’t be too hard to leave the sheet empty. But this semester, in order to counteract this boycott, proctors will insist that everyone completes a form. If it becomes impossible to boycott, I urge students to sabotage the forms, either by giving only the lowest number or by filling in more than one oval for each question.

I also fervently hope that first years will join this boycott. Although no one has a choice of first year professors, next year you will have choices. If you boycott now, you will be more likely to have the information next year when you will really need it.

This boycott will succeed. The faculty will not give up course evaluations. If they have to, they will disclose the results in order to keep them. Bice says he uses the evaluations for so many things. Does he really want to do without them?

Here again are the arguments for a full disclosure:

• Students want and need course evaluation materials. Not just course descriptions. We want to know if the professor can teach!
• The best time to get course evaluations is during finals period, since more people will complete the evaluation at that time. After final grades are posted is too late, since after spring semester all the third year’s are gone. Also, it is harder to get people to fill out surveys put in their box.
• It is redundant for the SBA to conduct its own course survey. Some have suggested we attach our own survey to the administrations’ survey. What good would that do? Why go to all the trouble to get people to answer the same questions twice?
• It is difficult for the SBA to organize and produce an independent course guide. Witness the shortcomings of this semester’s guide.
• Students will publish a Course Guide anyway, so there will be no added embarrassment if we get to use the course evaluation statistics. Bice doesn’t want to be associated with a public “grading” of faculty. He is just going to have to get over it. Most Universities make their course evaluations at least partially available for use in student course guides.
• Evaluations are important information. Bice considers the evaluation statistics too dangerous to expose to “minor” students. What he is really afraid of is that we might actually use the information and—God forbid—avoid courses which are taught by lousy professors. Bice would rather have an entire class suffer through a semester with a bad professor than risk embarrassing that professor. He is also worried that we might find out that he continues to rehire part-time faculty in spite of their atrocious averages.
• In response to the argument that young professors may get unjustly deserved reputations, I would counter that publishing course evaluations would reward professors whom the students like and might actually give an incentive for better teaching. (Rather Posnerian, don’t you think?)
• I don’t think there should be any compromise on this. Either they give us all the information, evaluations and comments too, or we don’t fill them out. I don’t think there are any questions on the evaluation form that are too sensitive. In fact, the more sensitive, the more useful it will probably be to students.

The problem with disclosure boils down to this: If you are concerned about the hurt feelings of bad teachers, you support Dean Bice and oppose any student Course Guide. If you think that students have a right to know information which they provide, and if you think that it is more important that students be able to make informed choices then you support the boycott. Don’t be intimidated! Boycott course evaluations!

“Legion Lex Meets for First Inn of Court Dinner”

Law Street Journal Article (October 1, 1990)

By Randol Schoenberg

On September 18, the Legion Lex Inn of Court held the first of eight programs designed to educate and entertain USC alumni.

Last month’s meeting at Town & Gown featured a program entitled, “The First 30 Days: Winning the Case by Use of Provisional Remedies.” The speakers were Allan Grossman, President of Inn of Court, and name partner at Grossman & Diamond, Bruce Mitchell, Commissioner of the Superior Court, Richard Chernick, partner at Gibson, Dunn, and Professor Erwin Chemerinksy.

The evening began with cocktails in the courtyard and then a fine dinner inside Town & Gown. Afterward, the group of forty lawyers, USC alumni old and young, adjourned to the mock trial room in the Law Center.

Grossman and Chemerinsky began the program with a discussion of professional responsibility. In tag team style they presented the current law and addressed problem areas for practicing lawyers, such as communication with opposing parties, splitting fees, and Chemerinksy’s favorite topic, Rule 11 sanctions.

Commissioner Mitchell then explained the procedure used in obtaining a writ of attachment which he called one of the most powerful prejudgment tools in commercial litigation.

A Writ of Attachment allows a plaintiff to seize the defendant’s assets to insure payment if he can show a probable right to recover in the case. Most plaintiffs will be forced to settle once the Writ is granted since operating a business whose assets have been seized is nearly impossible. The Writ safeguards the plaintiff’s interest before the defendant has a chance to dispose of his assets.

Chernick, a former Inn of Court President, generously declined to give his part of the program since the other speakers had gone over time. He promised to speak at a later Inn of Court meeting.

Inn of Court is an international organization of lawyers and judges. The Inn began in England as a social club for barristers. In America, the Inn has served both a social and an educational role.

Legion Lex wants to encourage law students to attend Inn of Court meetings. The next meeting will be on Tuesday, October 16, at 6:00 p.m. and will feature a demonstration in jury selection. Student participants are needed. If interested, please contact Marlene Bega in the Development and Alumni Office in Town & Gown, room 200.

Garza v. L.A. County, the lawsuit currently being brought by MALDEF, the ACLU, and the U.S. Department of Justice against the L.A. County Board of Supervisors, raises unique questions regarding the voting power of racial groups with respect to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and its 1982 Amendments. In this paper I will focus on the sections of the Act which deal with unintentional effects on voting power, and not those dealing with electoral systems which are purposely designed to dilute minority group voting strength—admittedly an equally significant issues in the Garza suit. I hope to show that the racial demographics of L.A. County present problems which previous Voting Rights Act cases failed to consider, specifically, that the absence of an absolute racial majority among the four large racial groups in L.A. County permits in one sense a greater opportunity for political participation, but at the same time allow no totally equitable method of apportioning voting power among the racial groups.

Section 2(b) of the Voting Rights Act provides that Section 2(a) is violated where the “totality of circumstances” reveals that “the political processes leading to nomination or election…are not equally open to participation by members of a [protected class]…in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” In the major Supreme Court case interpreting the Act, Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), Justice Brennan for the majority cited a list of seven plus two “typical factors” which can be considered relevant to the “totality of the circumstances.” One of the factors is “(2) the extent to which voting in the elections…is racially polarized.” Such voting has been termed “racial bloc voting”. Brennan’s opinion indicated that the existence of racially polarized voting and “the extent to which minority groups have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction” are the two “most important” factors in a Section 2 claim. Gingles, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 2766 n.15.

There is a good deal of disagreement on how to determine the existence of racial bloc voting. (See, for example, “Racial Polarization in Vote Dilution Cases Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The impact of Thornburg v. Gingles”, Paul W. Jacobs, II and Timothy G. O’Rourke, Journal of Law & Politics, p. 295.) Notwithstanding such disputes, for the purposes of this paper we shall accept the plaintiff’s assertions and assume racial bloc voting exists—but for all the racial groups in L.A. County. Furthermore, we are going to assume that every citizen is a member of one and only one racial group, and that members of a racial group will all agree to vote in the same way—that is, as a voting bloc. These assumptions describe the most extreme case of racial bloc voting. Note that they should strengthen the Voting Rights Act claim. As we shall argue below, our findings will hold for less than absolute racial bloc voting as well, so these assumptions will not weaken our argument.

If racial bloc voting is assumed, the plaintiffs in Garza have a very strong case. No non-white has been elected to the L.A. County Board of Supervisors since 1875. (Elizabeth Braithwaite Burke, a black woman, was appointed to the Board by Governor Jerry Brown but lost her first election to current Board-member Dean Dana.) With Brennan’s two “most important” factors, the district court could conclude that the voting power of minority groups in L.A. County has been diluted, and that Section 2 of the Voting Right Act has been violated. But in determining the appropriate remedy, the court will have to ask again the question that Brennan attempted to avoid with his “seven plus two” factors” What is voting power, and how is it apportioned among the racial groups in L.A. County?

Voting power is the ability to determine the outcome of a vote. In theory, every individual voter has the ability to determine the outcome of the vote. That is, if all the other voters split their votes between two candidates, the individual voter will decide the election by his/her vote. In that sense, the voting power of all the individual votes in L.A. County should be equal so long as we do not assume anything about the preferences of the voters, and assuming that the districts are the same size. Each person has the opportunity to cast a potentially deciding vote for his/her supervisor. Similarly, that supervisor has voting power because he/she can cast the deciding vote on the Board of Supervisors. One individual can cast the deciding vote for a supervisor who can cast the deciding vote on an issue before the board. Therefore, each individual voter has voting power in that his/her vote can determine the outcome of a vote on the Board.

However, we have decided to assume racial bloc voting. Bloc voting implies that the individual voters are not voting independently. It may no longer be possible for one individual to cast the deciding vote, because it may not be possible for all the other voters to split their votes evenly between two candidates. Furthermore, it may be impossible for the voting bloc as a whole to decide the election. In both cases the individual is powerless, because neither he/she nor the voting bloc has the ability to decide the outcome of the election. Since this argument is at the core of our discussion, we shall explain it in more detail.

Let us take as an example a district with five voters. In theory, if we do not assume anything about voter preferences, each voter has voting power and may determine the outcome of the election if the other voters split evenly. Now let’s assume that the five voters belong to three voting blocs: A, B and C. Bloc A has three members; B and C have one member each. The members of a voting bloc will always vote for the same candidate. In the election, B and C have no voting power because they cannot affect the outcome in any way. No matter how B and C vote, A (and it’s voters) will decide the winner of the election since A controls more than half of the votes. An election which seems perfectly fair becomes one-sided when we assume bloc voting. If voting power is the ability to determine the outcome of an election, then B and C have no voting power.

Most of the cases on vote dilution have dealt with districts as composed of only two groups: whites and non-whites. In many of these cases whites composed more than fifty percent of the overall population in the jurisdiction, and the districts inside the jurisdiction were divided up so that whites also had a majority in nearly all districts. In such a case for example, a state with a 70% white population could have nearly 100% white representatives in the legislature. The Voting Rights Act sought to remedy the situation, and without guaranteeing proportional representation to minority groups in the legislature to at least give minority groups a chance to have some representatives. That usually meant creating districts where the non-white population was well over 50%. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144. While those solutions may have given minority voters all of the voting power within their few minority controlled districts, it did not give minority groups any voting power in the legislature where a large majority of the seats were still controlled by white-majority districts. Minority voters could elect a representative, but that representative would be powerless to affect the outcome of a vote important to his constituents. The white majority still held all of the legislative voting power.

In effect, the court confused the discussion by segregating voting power. The primary power to affect the outcome of a vote on the legislature would remain in the hands of the white majority, but a secondary voting power would be afforded to minority groups. The emasculated secondary voting power is merely the opportunity to elect a legislatively powerless representative. Certainly, that representative can serve his/her constituents by raising issues on the floor of the legislature, by serving on legislative committees, and by answering constituent letters. The secondary power is not negligible, and that is perhaps why it was desired by minority politicians, but having representation is not the whole story. Just as we showed above that the ability to vote does not guarantee the ability to affect the outcome of an election, having a representative does not guarantee power over the legislative process.

No one would disagree that the power to pass laws is the real power of a legislator. But one might argue that minority representatives do exert voting power in the legislature by forming alliances and coalitions. That is of course true, but their ability to do so is constrained by white majority bloc voting. Remember that if the white majority did not vote as a bloc, then there would be a no racially polarized voting, and likely no violation of the Voting Rights Act. If whites did not vote in a bloc, minority candidates would be able to win elections. But we have assumed racial bloc voting and the inability of minority candidates to win an election. If representatives mirror the interests of the constituents who elected them, then we can expect the representatives also to vote as a racial bloc.

It may be true that voters vote in racial blocs, but legislators do not. That would indicate that legislators are not voting with the will of the majority that elected them. But if that is true, and legislators are more enlightened and independent of their constituents, then we need not worry about racial bloc voting in the first place. The assumption of the Voting Rights Act claim was that legislators elected by all-white majorities were inconsiderate of the interests of the non-white minorities in their districts.

In truth minority voting blocs do exert some power in the legislature. But that is because the white majority vote is split into two political parties who do not vote together as a bloc. Minorities can form dominant coalitions with other interest groups within the political parties and therefore have been able to exert voting power. But this argument would indicate that minority voters should also be able to form winning coalitions to represent their interests in a district election, unless they are geographically separated from other potential allies. If the white majority does not vote as a racial bloc, then minority blocs should be able to form coalitions to win elections, and there will be likely no Voting Rights Act violation. But we began by assuming racial bloc voting and violation of the Act.

Of course the problem is that so long as there is one group with an absolute majority our political system is designed to give that group absolute power. Such is almost always the case when there are only two groups. One will have more than 50% and the other less than 50%. And the majority rules. But what happens when there are more than two groups and no one group has an absolute majority? Such is now the case for racial groups in Los Angeles County.

If no single group can control the outcome of an election by itself then a group must form a coalition to win. For example, if groups A, B and C each have one vote, then the winning coalitions are AB, AC, BC and ABC. A group has voting power if it can determine the outcome. If the group can form a coalition which is winning with the group as a member of the coalition, but losing if the group withdraws its support, then the group has power in that coalition. Group A has power in the coalitions AB and AC, but not in ABC because that coalition will still win if A changes its vote. Similarly, B has power in the coalitions AB and BC. Group C has power in the coalitions AC and BC. Since all three groups have the ability to build winning coalitions and possibly determine the outcome of an election, all three have voting power in the district.

A plurality in one district does not guarantee that every group will have voting power in the district, nor does it mean that the groups will have equal power or power proportional to their size, but at least three groups will have some power. For example, if there are four groups: A, B, C and D. A has 4 votes, B and C each have 3 votes, and D has only one vote. Any two of the groups A, B and C can form a winning coalition with 6 or 7 of the 11 votes. But group D cannot contribute anything to any coalition. Any winning coalition with D, would also be winning if D withdrew its vote. A, B and C will negotiate and form coalitions without regard for D. Therefore D has no voting power. Notice also that A’s extra vote doesn’t give the group any more power. A still must form a coalition with either B or C to win, and the extra vote shouldn’t give A any additional bargaining power.[1]

As a further example of voting power disproportionate to size, let A and B have 100 votes each. C has 2 votes. D has 1 vote. It is still true that D has no power, as above. But what about C? Extraordinarily, C has just as much power as A and B! Just as in the two previous examples, any two of the three groups A, B and C can form a winning coalition. AB has 200 votes, but AC and BC will win also with 102 votes. Each of the three groups can form two winning coalitions in which it has power. The voting power of the three groups is identical even though C has less than 1% of the total vote and A and B nearly 50%. Poor D with only one vote less than C is powerless. This example is extreme but not uncommon. In Israel the two major parties, Likud and Labor each control just under 50% of the votes. The comparably small non-aligned religious parties have an extraordinary amount of power. Until recently the two large parties formed a coalition, but now that the coalition has fallen apart the small parties have a chance to exert their power. Just last month a Labor coalition was narrowly defeated when two religious party members defected at the last minute. The power to make or break a winning coalition is what we mean by voting power and often voting power does not correspond to the size of a group.

The voting power of a group is determined by its ability to form winning coalitions. Professor John Banzhaf has proposed a model for calculating the relative voting power between voters.[2] There are five members of the Board of Supervisors. On any proposal before the Board, each of the five supervisors can vote yes or no. Therefore, there are 32(2⁵) combinations of votes.[3] A Supervisor holds a critical vote when the four other supervisors split their votes 2-2, that is when he/she is on the winning side of a 3-2 board vote. That occurs in 12 of the 32 combinations for each supervisor.[4] Therefore, each supervisor will hold a critical vote in 12 of the 32 combinations, or 3/8 of the time. So we say that, according to the Banzhaf Index, each supervisor has voting power equal to 3/8. If we were not assuming bloc voting, we could proceed to calculate in the same manner the number of critical votes for each person voting in a Supervisorial District election. If we then multiplied the results of the calculations for the district elections with the Banzhaf index for each supervisor (3/8) we would get the voting power of each individual voter in the County of Los Angeles with respect to the Board of Supervisors. In other words, the chance that a voter will have a critical vote for his/her supervisor multiplied by the chance that that supervisor will hold a critical vote on the Board will be equal to the chance that a voter will determine the outcome of a vote on the Board of Supervisors. And the chance to determine the outcome is what we have defined as “voting power”.

Before we begin the analysis of racial bloc voting power, I would like to repeat the assumption we have made. First, voting power is the ability to determine the outcome of an election or any other voting process. Second, a representative will vote according to the will of the majority in his/her district. This second assumption lies at the center of any “one person, one vote” claim. No legislator should be free to disregard the will of the people who elected him/her. That is why legislators are forced to undergo periodic elections. If the goal of the legislator is to get reelected, he/she must serve the interests of a majority of the voting population.[5] If we were to assume that representatives do not vote in accordance with the interests of the voters who elect them, then no amount of tinkering with the electoral districts would make any difference. Unless a person’s vote can potentially determine an outcome, that is, elect a preferred representative who is preferred because he will vote a certain way, then by our first assumption there is no voting power.

Our third assumption in the Banzhaf analysis of the supervisors was that all outcomes on the Board of Supervisors are equally significant. This point has been greatly misunderstood, and has led the U. S. Supreme Court to twice reject the Banzhaf analysis. Last year in Board of Estimate of City of New York v. Morris, 109 S.Ct. 1433, Justice White writing for the majority quoted his earlier opinion in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 402 U.S. 124 (1971), stating “In [Whitcomb] we observed that the Banzhaf methodology ‘remains a theoretical one’ and is unrealistic in not taking into account any political or other facts which might affect the actual voting power of the residents, which might include party affiliation, race, previous voting characteristics or any other factors which go into the entire political voting situation.’ Id., at 145-146.” 109 S.Ct. 1433. Morris involved a New York City board which was made up of five Borough presidents with one vote each, and three at-large members (the Mayor, the Comptroller and President of the City Council) with two votes each. Residents of the larger boroughs sued because they alleged that residents of Staten Island had a disproportionate amount of voting power. Staten Island’s population was 352,121 whereas the population of the largest borough, Brooklyn, was 2,230,936. (The average borough population was 1,414,206.) The District Court and Court of Appeals made two erroneous calculations in determining the deviation in voting power among residents of the five boroughs. First, they failed to include the power of the at-large members; second they calculated voting power by dividing the member’s voting power by the voting population in his district when they should have divided by the square root of the population.[6] Because of these two mistakes, the lower courts determined a deviation of 132.9%,[7] when the more correct Banzhaf analysis would have found a deviation of only 30% in voting power. The Supreme Court agreed with Amicus Banzhaf with regard to the effect of the at-large members, but failed to adopt his rule for dividing by the square of the population. The court instead chose to follow the method elucidated in Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 184, which prescribes that voting power is directly proportional to the number of voters in the district. Although the court criticized Banzhaf for not “reflect[ing] the way the board actually works in practice,” the court then went on to praise the Abate approach, because “It does not attempt to inquire whether, in terms of how the legislature actually works in practice, the districts have equal power to affect a legislative outcome.” In fact the only advantage of the Abate approach is that it preserves an aesthetic equality, because “it does assure that legislators will be elected by and represent citizens in districts of substantially equal size.”[8] The problem with the Abate test is that not only does it suffer from exactly the same criticisms as the Banzhaf method, but it also produces results which are incorrect. In Morris it distorted and exaggerated the divergence in voting power on the Board because it assumed, incorrectly, that voting power proportional to the number of voters, when in fact it is proportional to the square root.[9]

What seems to trouble the court most is that Banzhaf doesn’t take into account the “realities” of voting. Banzhaf assumes that every voter has a choice independent of the other voters. So, for example, on a Board of five members, there are 32 equally likely outcomes. The appellate court in Morris proudly pointed out that the five Borough presidents often voted as a block.[10] Banzhaf freely admits that his method did not take into account other determining factors, which might make certain votes less likely to occur. However, this is not necessarily true. Banzhaf’s method could easily accompany any predetermined set of conditions on voting, as we shall explain below. Banzhaf gave several reasons why his method failed to take into account voting patterns preferences, attributable to party affiliation and race. First, he argued that courts would have a difficult time calculating voting power disparities if it had to figure in voting patterns. (Note that much of the post-Gingles litigation has centered on proving the existence of racial bloc voting, involving reams of statistical evidence and much debate on statistical methods.) Second, he argued that many of the affiliations may be temporary, and would therefore require constant litigation and reconfiguration of districts equalized on account of those affiliations. Finally, Banzhaf argues, “the whole purpose of the ‘one man, one vote’ cases is to equalize the ‘rules of the game’—i.e., the allocation of voting power inherent in the rules for voting—and not the way the voting power is actually used in practice.”   Banzhaf, Amicus Brief. In rejecting the Banzhaf analysis in favor of the Abate test, the court chose to equalize the appearance of voting power, rather than equalize the power itself. White admits as much when he states,

The personal right to vote is a value in itself, and a citizen is, without more and without mathematically calculating his power to determine the outcomes of an election, shortchanged if he may vote for only one representative when citizens in a neighboring district, of equal population vote for two; or to put it another way, if he may vote for one representative and the voters in another district half the size also elect one representative Board of Estimate v. Morris, 109 S.Ct 1433.

The problem with the Abate approach is that it might favor a proportionally equal representation, when Banzhaf analysis would show it to be unfair. And it might strike down an equitable weighted voting regime, because it appeared to give unequal representation.[11]

The court dismissed the Banzhaf analysis because it relied on the equal likelihood of voting outcomes.[12] The question then is, would the court accept a Banzhafian analysis which did take into account the predilections of the voters. Suppose we want to find the voting power in districts in which there is racial bloc voting.[13] In our previous examples we have shown how such bloc voting will skew the power to effect the outcome of an election. Banzhaf merely directs us to calculate the number of possible outcomes in which a group has voting power. For example, suppose in one district we have four voting blocs—W, H, B, and A. W has 39%, H has 47%, B has 4%, and A has 10% of the votes. A winning coalition must have more than 50% of the votes. The winning coalitions are WH, WBA, HB, HA, WHB, WHA, HBA, and WHBA. A group has voting power in the coalition if it has a critical vote, that is, if the coalition is winning with the group, but not winning if the group withdraws. For example, all three groups have power in the coalition WBA, only H has power in WHA, and no group has power in WHBA. There are 16 different coalitions (8 winning and 8 losing). The Banzhaf index is the number of coalitions in which a group has voting power divided by the total number of possible coalitions. In our example, W has power in two coalitions (WH and WBA) out of sixteen for a Banzhaf index of 2/16 = 1/8. Group H has power in six coalitions (WH, HB, HA, WHB, WHA, and WBA) for a Banzhaf index of 6/16 = 3/8. Group B has power in two coalitions (HB and WBA) for an index of 1/8. Group A also has power in two coalitions (HA and WBA) for an index of 1/8. We write the voting power of the four groups (W,H,B,A) as a vector (1/8, 3/8, 1/8, 1/8). According to the Banzhaf index, H has three times the power of the other groups. W has the same power as the much smaller groups B and A. Once again, these calculations are based on three assumptions: (1) Voting power is the ability to determine the outcome of an election; (2) Absolute bloc voting exists; and (3) The voting blocs act independently in choosing to join or not to join a coalition. The last assumption means that any coalition of the four blocs is possible, and therefore significant.[14]

The question presented by Garza is, what is the voting power of the racial groups in L.A. County? We will use the Banzhaf index to calculate power in two ways. First, we will calculate the voting power of racial blocs within each of the five supervisorial districts. This will be equivalent to the secondary voting power, which the court has shown so much interest in, that is, the ability to elect a representative of the group’s choice. Second, we will calculate primary voting power for each group in the County as a whole, that is, the ability to determine the outcome of a vote on the Board of Supervisors. It should be clear that having secondary voting power does not guarantee having primary voting power.[15] The data we shall use is clearly inadequate, but efforts to obtain better information were unsuccessful.[16] Nevertheless, the method of our analysis would still be useful once actual statistical voting data has been determined.

Table 1 shows the population of L.A. County according to race. There are four distinct racial groups, each with a sizable population. White, Hispanic, Black and Asian. In our example above, we have already calculated the voting power of racial blocs in District 1. (W=White=39%, H=Hispanic=47%, B-Black=4%, and A=Asian=10%.) In Districts 4 and 5 it is obvious that the White voting bloc has all of the power since it constitutes more than 50% of the votes in each district, and therefore does not have to form a coalition with any other group. So we say that that in those districts Whites have voting power equal to one, and all the other groups have voting power zero. (That is, Whites will control 100% of the time and the other groups 0%.) However, in Districts 2 and 3 we again have a plurality among the racial groups, so we can proceed to calculate voting power as we did for District 1. Table 2 shows the results of these calculations. District 3 turns out to be identical to District 1, in that the Hispanic bloc can form a winning coalition with any one other group, whereas only a coalition of all three of the other blocs can defeat it. District 2 is similar to some of our previous examples, where any pair of the three larger groups can form a winning coalition, while the smallest group is powerless.

Table 1

Population of L.A. County by Race

Table 2

Secondary Voting Power in L.A. County by Race

At first glance, it would appear from Table 2 that the White bloc would have a great advantage when we came to calculate the primary voting power in L.A. County. After all, they control two districts outright and only three are needed to control a vote on the Board of Supervisors. But in fact, their majority in two districts does not give them any advantage. The relevant coalitions (ones in which each of the members casts a deciding vote, i.e. has voting power) which will control three or more supervisors are White-Black (Districts 2, 4 ,5), White-Hispanic (Districts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) and Black-Hispanic (Districts 1, 2, 3). Asians can join any of the coalitions, but they will have no voting power since their votes is not necessary to make the coalition winning. Because any two of the three groups (White, Hispanic, and Black) can join to make a winning coalition, all three have equal voting power, and Asians have none. The voting power vector is (W, H, B, A) = (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.0).

We might notice that the Black-Hispanic coalition is the weakest of the three winning coalitions. It wins only a narrow majority in Districts 1 and 3. If our data is not indicative of normal voting distributions, then it could very well be that the situation in L.A. County is more similar to a (3/8, 1/8, 1/8, 1/8) configuration, in which Whites can form a winning coalition with any one other racial bloc to control 3 or more districts, whereas the three other groups can only win by banding together or joining White. This is probably a more accurate description of voting power in L.A. County, since Hispanics tend not to vote in numbers proportionate to the size of their population.[17]

In the wake of the Garza suit, the court may decide to supervise the redistricting of L.A. County following the 1990 census. Our calculations above demonstrate that the configuration can have a very large impact on the voting power of racial groups. For example, Blacks may have as much power as Whites and Hispanics, but Asians, with a greater population may be left without any power. There is a potential to gerrymander the districts so that either Whites or Hispanics control three or more of the supervisors. A group only needs just over 50% in three of the five districts, or a little more than 30% of the total countywide population to control the Board of Supervisors. Both Whites and Hispanics make up well over 30% of the overall population. In fact, it has been demonstrated that the voting power of an interest group is maximized if its members are split evenly among just over half of the districts.[18]

Clearly, the most equitable solution would give some measure of voting power to all the racial groups. Since no group has more than 50% of the votes in L.A. County, such a solution would be possible. Unfortunately, Gingles and its progeny focus on the creation of majority districts (“safe seats”) and not ones which require coalitions.[19] The majority approach makes sense only when there is one group which constitutes an absolute majority, and the courts wish to afford the minority groups some secondary voting power only. But the situation in L.A. County permits distribution of primary voting power as well as secondary power so that all the racial groups have a share. Districts in which one race holds an absolute majority are the least equitable, and L.A.’s racial mix permits a solution which avoids such districts by setting up a plurality in each and every supervisorial district. Such a solution would require coalition-forming for primary and secondary voting power, and would afford all racial groups a degree of participation in the political process which previously has been impossible. As L.A. City Council member Richard Allatore predicts, “Ultimately, the success of Hispanics, of Asians, of Blacks will be through coalitions.”[20]

Although the coalition-based distribution of power allows greater participating by minority groups, it does not necessarily give groups power proportional to their size. We have demonstrated already many times in this paper how very small groups can have a relatively large amount of power, how larger groups can have no more power than much smaller groups, and how some sizable groups can be zoned out of the power distribution altogether. If we divide L.A. County into only four groups, then the power vector will probably look like (3/8, 1/8, 1/8, 1/8) or (1/4, ¼, ¼, 0). An equal distribution among all four groups is only possible if no combination of two groups has more than 50%, which will happen only if all four groups are the same size. Finally, if the two larger groups have the same population and the two smaller groups are equal too—for example, (40%, 40%, 10%, 10%)—then in that unlikely event the power vector would be (1/4, ¼, 1/8, 1/8). But that situation and the previous one are probably impossible, since there would have to be votes ending in a tie. So if we are asked to choose between (3/8, 1/8, 1/8, 1/8) and (1/4, ¼, ¼, 0), the former seems more equitable since it gives all groups a chance at achieving a winning coalition. But it also gives one group much more power than the other three. Power cannot be apportioned according to and in proportion with the population of a racial voting bloc. Perhaps the situation would appear more equitable if there were more than four voting blocs—for example, if each of the racial groups was divided into different political blocs, or if the racial groups were subdivided into smaller and more cohesive groups.

Regardless of the efficacy of the outcome, the Banzhaf method is a powerful tool in analyzing voting power. Any assumptions which the court is willing to make can be accommodated. For example, if there is not absolute racial bloc voting, but still a violation of the Voting Rights Act, the Banzhaf analysis can still determine the actual voting power of the groups assuming limited bloc voting. If only a percentage of a racial group votes as a bloc, say 70%, then assume there is a bloc of 70% and consider the other 30% as independent voters. Say there are two groups A and B with 100 voters each. Say that 70% of A and 60% of B vote as a bloc. Then our voting system has one bloc of 70 voters, one bloc of 60 voters and 70 independent voters (or 70 blocs of one voter each). The calculations are more complicated, but one can still figure out the likelihood that one of the blocs will cast a deciding vote. Banzhaf has shown that when there are a greater number of voting blocs, the members of a large voting bloc often have proportionately more power than members of small blocs.[21] But when the number of groups is small, a larger group may not have any more power, and might even have proportionately less power.

It is up to the court to decide which voting characteristics are important. There is some precedent for considering racial and political groups in determining the fairness of districting and election schemes. However, investigation into the statistical predilections of voters is extremely time-consuming, and of debatable utility. A decision must be made on the value of such inquiries. Once a standard has been established the court should not avoid mathematical models, merely because they are difficult or abstract. Indeed, mathematical models are perhaps the only method of determining the appropriate remedy. If the court has decided that the voting power of minority racial blocs may not be “diluted” then it should adopt an approach which provides for the most equitable distribution of power “to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” (Voting Rights Act Section 2b.) Such an approach should use mathematical models to apportion both primary and secondary voting political power among the groups which the court has decided to protect.

The multiracial demographics of L.A. County present an opportunity for greater minority participation in government. My contention is that greater participation is not necessarily promoted by safe seats and supermajorities, which have been the remedies suggested by the Supreme Court—also the one sought by plaintiffs in Garza. If the Court is willing to reconsider its definition of voting power in favor of the widely accepted Banzhaf analysis, it might then achieve remedies which not only provide a fair chance of minority representation, but more importantly give all voters a piece of the ultimate political power.

[1] Group A’s extra vote could conceivably give A an advantage because it might have more resources, i.e. sources of funding, volunteers, canvassers, etc. But the availability of funding from the constituents and other resources is probably determined by the wealth or other characteristics of the group members and not their number.

[2] I first came across the Banzhaf method in an introductory game theory course at Princeton University. See Game Theory, Second Edition, Guillermo Owen (Academic Press Inc., 1982) p. 213-225.

[3] We can illustrate this by writing out the votes (Yes or No) of the five supervisors as follows:

Supervisor                    Supervisor                    Supervisor                     Supervisor

1,2,3,4,5                       1,2,3,4,5                       1,2,3,4,5                     1,2,3,4,5

(Y,Y,Y,Y,Y)                  (N,Y,Y,Y,Y)                  (Y,N,Y,Y,Y)                  (N,N,Y,Y,Y)

(Y,Y,Y,Y,N)                  (N,Y,Y,Y,N)                  (Y,N,Y,Y,N)                  (N,N,Y,Y,N)

(Y,Y,Y,N,Y)                  (N,Y,Y,N,Y)                  (Y,N,Y,N,Y)                  (N,N,Y,N,Y)

(Y,Y,Y,N,N)                  (N,Y,Y,N,N)                  (Y,N,Y,N,N)                  (N,N,Y,N,N)

(Y,Y,N,Y,Y)                  (N,Y,N,Y,Y)                  (Y,N,N,Y,Y)                  (N,N,N,Y,Y)

(Y,Y,N,Y,N)                  (N,Y,N,Y,N)                  (Y,N,N,Y,N)                  (N,N,N,Y,N)

(Y,Y,N,N,Y)                  (N,Y,N,N,Y)                  (Y,N,N,N,Y)                  (N,N,N,N,Y)

(Y,Y,N,N,N)                  (N,Y,N,N,N)                  (Y,N,N,N,N)                  (N,N,N,N,N)

[4] For each supervisor, the votes of the other four can split in the following six ways: (YYNN), (YNYN), (YNNY), (NYNY), (NYYN), and (NNYY). Since the supervisor can vote either yes or no for each of these, there are 12 combinations (of the 32 listed in footnote 3) in which the supervisor holds a critical swing vote.

[5] If an issue appeals only to a limited number of interested voters, the representative should choose the new of the majority of the interested voters. No assumptions can be made about the preferences of the disinterested voters, so the representative has to assume that they will split evenly between him/her and an opponent regarding that issue. It is therefore more correct to assume that legislator will vote for x over y if and only if the number of voters in his district who prefer x to y is greater than the number who prefer y to x.

[6] One important result of the Banzhaf analysis is that “in situations where each person has one vote his or her ability to cast a critical or decisive note doesn’t decrease linearly (proportionately) with the number of people voting.” (Banzhaf, Amicus Brief for Board of Estimate of City of New York v. Morris, 109 S.Ct. 1433.) In fact, for large numbers of voters the Banzhaf Index decreases according to the square root of the number of persons voting. For example, we have shown that the number of critical votes with five people voting is 12 out of 32 combinations or 37%. For 15 people voting, a person will cast the deciding vote in 6864 out of 32768 combinations or 21% of the time. Although the number of voters was increased by a factor of three (5 to 15), the Banzhaf Index of their voting power decreased by a factor of 1.8 (37% to 21%), which is approximately the square root of three.

[7] The total deviation is the deviation of the smallest borough from the average plus the deviation of the largest borough from the average. Staten Island was 75.1% smaller than average. Brooklyn was 57.8% larger than average. Therefore the deviation is 75.1% + 57.8% = 132.9%

[8] The appellate court held that, “the district court properly adopted the Abate theory that what the equal protection clause requires be equalized among voters is their ‘share’ of representatives on the government body in question. In the simplest cases, where each representative has an equal vote (i.e., there is no weighted voting), Abate requires only that the court look to the number of citizens in each representative’s district; equality is achieved where those numbers are equal.” 831 F.2d 384. The court’s sole reference to a voter’s share, as opposed to their more common reference to voting power, is apt. A voter’s share is proportional to the population of the district. For example, if the representative is given $1,000,000 and decides to hand it out to all 100,000 constituents in equal shares, each voter should expect to receive $10. However, whether the representative decides to hand out the money to all voters will necessarily be decided by the desires of a majority of the voters (applying the analysis above) and in that sense the voter’s power to form a majority is the essential factor. That power is best calculated by the Banzhaf Index, and corresponds to the square root of the population (footnote 6).

[9] Using the Abate test, the court has approved multi-member district schemes, which under Banzhaf analysis would appear extremely unfair. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124.

[10] Of course, the obvious response is that if they voted as bloc, it shouldn’t make any difference that the Boroughs were different sizes. (Banzhaf, Amicus Brief, Board of Estimate v. Morris, 831 F.2d. 384.)

[11] For example, in a legislature with many multimember or weighted districts, if district A has 200 people with 2 representatives, and district B has 400 people with 4 representatives, Abate would approve although Banzhaf would not. Likewise, if district A had 200 people and a representative with 2 votes, while district B had 400 people and a representative with 2.83 votes, Banzhaf might approve, but Abate would clearly object. The former case resembles Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124. See also, Banzhaf, Multi-Member Electoral Districts—Do They Violate the “One Man, One Vote” Principle, 75 Yale L.J. 1309 (1966).

[12] Banzhaf objects to the use of “likelihood” because of the court’s relentless harping on the unrealistic assumption. He instead favors “significance”. Both terms are in fact accurate. His response should be that if the court would determine which outcomes are more likely, then his method could include that into the calculations.

[13] The method we propose would also work for party bloc voting, or any other assumptions which contradict the independence of individual voters.

[14] One might argue that two of the blocs always vote together. Then they should be considered as one bloc, not two separate blocs. Remember that our example assumed that no single bloc had a majority of the votes. Having an election assumes that at some level there are independent decisions being made. If this were not true, then there would no need to have an election. The outcome would be predetermined.

[15] We have already shown that merely having a vote does not mean having voting power. Similarly, having a representative does not mean that representative has any voting power on the legislative body.

[16] Our source is the L.A, County Department of Health Services, Population Estimate and Protection System, June 21, 1989. The data shows only total population broken down by race. The data could be improved by regarding only citizens, voting-age citizens, people eligible to vote, registered citizens, actual voters. It is debatable whether actual or potential voters should be used, since the presence or absence of voting power may have an impact on the number of actual voters within a group.

[17] “Studies over the decade have shown that Asians and Latinos vote at a significantly lower rate than other citizens. A study by political scientists at Caltech found that 11% fewer Asians and 20% fewer Latinos voted in the 1984 presidential election, compared to blacks and whites who voted at virtually the same rate.” L.A. Times, May 7, 1990, p. 24.

[18] J. Snyder, “Political Geography and Interest Group Power”. Social Choice and Welfare (1989) 6:103-125. For very small groups, their power is maximized if they are spread over all the districts.

[19] The fourth Circuit rejected an innovative “limited voting” remedy because it read Gingles as requiring the acceptance of the County’s single-member district proposal which set up a few “safe” minority districts. Because the minority population was spread out among the white majority population, only a few safe districts could be created. The limited voting scheme would have afforded black voters with more power than the creation of safe seats would allow. The Court read Gingles’ admonition against a right in proportional representation as requiring only a safe seat remedy, even though some other remedy might afford greater representation. McGhee v. Granville, 860 F.2d 110.

[20] L.A. Times, May 7, 1990, p. 24.

[21] See for example, Banzhaf, 3.312 Votes, A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral College, 13 Villanova L. Rev. 303 (1968). Presidential election voters in California have more than three times the voting power of voters in much smaller states, such Rhode Island or Washington D.C., even though smaller states have proportionately more electoral college representatives.

“Diversity Rally, Libel Show Successes”

Law Street Journal Article (May 1990)

By Randol Schoenberg

This year’s Libel Show had a lot to prove. Last year’s show created so much animosity that many people questioned whether we should continue the law school tradition. But thanks to the strong leadership of Jennifer Vane, Doug Emhoff and Mary Ann Soden, the Libel Show regained its former glory to the delight of all who attended.

The audience seemed to be won over by the very first skit. When the opening statements of the three organizers were suddenly interrupted by the entrance of The Church Lady (Chris Johnston) the crowd roared with approval. Johnston called in his superior dancers (Sam Chuck and Steve Atlee) and began his show stopping rap. The crowd went wild.

The Libel Show Band (Maureen Baker, Bobby Skorpil, Andy Tebbe and Sean Luner) softened the crowd up before the curtain opened on the first skit and continued to perform throughout the show. The show owed its coherence to the band, who patiently worked and waded through 20 hours of rehearsals with the singers and actors. Baker’s rendition of the hit song (Black Velvet) was a big hit and a real crowd-pleaser. All of the skits went off without a hitch and got lots of laughs. In stark contrast to last year’s show, there were no complaints of offensiveness or violations of the harassment code. Highlights included “The Post-Conviction Love Connection” which starred Nikki Varyu, as a lovelorn love student, Chris Johnston as her would-be convict lover, and Jim Burgess as emcee and Chuck “Woolery” Weisselberg.

Doug Emhoff and Joan Marsh repeated their “Weekend Update” routine once again, ending in a capella Lambada sign-off. Mary Ann Soden added a touch of wry humor with her speech of pregnant innuendo as Sandra Day O’Connor. Ben Fishman filled in between skits with his hilarious “Top 10 List”, and Mike Hoffman thrilled the audiences the star of both “Al Caprone’s Fashion Show” and “Simon Says”. Jenny Vane led a cast of singers in various songs including a rousing “Rock Lobster”. Patty Berry showed her theatrical talents singing in “Top of the Class” and cackling like a chicken as Judy Resnick in “Simon Says”. I had lots of fun in “Dean Wiley’s Press Conference.”

There was only one complaint heard after the show and that was that it ended too soon. At just one hour, the show was half as long as last year’s disaster. The program was only one page long and the performers didn’t find themselves pelted by projectiles from an unruly audience. Much of the credit must be given to the people behind the scenes to make the show run smoothly. Debby Martin and Rebecca Mares worked the lights, and Mike Zwick adjusted the microphones between skits.

The Libel Show had a lot to prove this year. It proved it all and more.

“NEWS SHORTS”

Law Street Journal Article (May 1990)

By Randol Schoenberg

Discrimination…The U.S. Department of the Army Judge Advocate General has yet to return the signed statement of non-discrimination which the Placement Office now requires. The new policy prohibits any employers who discriminate on the basis of race, sex, or sexual orientation from using Law Center facilities. The statement which all employers must sign was sent out at the end of last year. If the Army doesn’t comply it will be banned from on campus interviews next year. However, employment information for the army is still available in the Placement Office files. Apparently the files are not considered law center “facilities.”

Library…On Friday, April 20 the new-old wing of the library was opened up. Although construction is not completely finished, books will be moved around at night over the next few weeks. Sitting in the library will be limited during finals. Perfect timing.

Sit down and shut up… The orange couches have disappeared in favor of smaller bluish-grey sofa chairs. Funny how they showed up just in time for the great May 4 bash. Everyone’s going to think that we’re the most comfortable law students in the country. Sandra D. should be really impressed.

More construction…There seem to be a lot more workers doing a lot more work now that the May 4 deadline is approaching. The bathrooms in the basement finally have double doors so the urinals are no longer in public view all the time. There still are no chairs outside the cafeteria in the California Lifestyle Student Lounge. Some shrubs appeared a few weeks ago, but the place still looks like a fish bowl.

May it please the court…The impressive new court room on the first floor of the new wing was opened up for the final Trial Advocacy role-playing contests of the year. Real judges and high school jurors participated for the benefit of the would-be trial lawyers.

“Construction: the Never Ending Story”

Law Street Journal Article (February 1990))

By Randol Schoenberg

Students and faculty returned to a somewhat larger and more comfortable building in January. The first sign of the new thinking that accomplished the expansion was the new student lockers. Everyone now has the luxury of the taller and deeper lockers that previously were only available on a first-come first-serve basis akin to acquisition of title in the old west.

In a stroke of genius, Dean of Students Robert Saltzman assigned specific lockers to all students, thereby avoiding a mad rush that would certainly have rivaled a 1979 Who concert in Cincinnati. Still, there remains some inequity in that all third years and half the second years received top lockers, while the rest had to stoop to the lower ones.

Two weeks later when the workmen had at last finished staining the wood panels, students hurriedly occupied the new student lounge. The ancient chairs and tables give the area an immediate lived-in look. The lounge, which will be named after a large donor, is adjoined by a semi-circular patio which will eventually be equipped with lounge chairs and other outdoor furniture. The designers have dubbed their design the “California Life Style Student Lounge”, noting that only in California could a lounge be partly outdoors. Students have suggested that the patio looks more like a fish bowl. If it were sealed and filled with water it would make a nice aquarium.

Student reactions to the new cafeteria were mixed. Bobby Skorpill said, “I had to wait nearly half an hour for the worst cheeseburger I’ve had in my life.” He conceded that the fries were good, however. Brent Osterstock tried the Chicken Burrito and commented, “I think I’ll survive until tomorrow.” Cheryl Doo’s taste buds were offended by the Chicken Taco Salad. “It’s not very appetizing. The Grill open [at Commons] is much better.” Doo suggested the addition of a sandwich deli and a little music to improve the ambience.

Most students lamented the loss of Roberto, who had manned a private eating truck outside the Law Center since September. In an obvious attempt to prevent competition, the University moved Roberto away. The first year class circulated a petition demanding Roberto’s immediate return, and Student Senator James Bozajian has requested action by the Senate, but has yet there has been no positive response. Audry Rohn summed up the feelings of her class when she said, “I can’t perceive three years of Cafeteria food especially without Roberto as an alternative.”

The prices at the cafeteria seem erratic and some have noticed differences with prices with Commons. Tom Foote was particularly upset that V8 costs $1.15, and also pointed out that a small bottle of Martinelli’s Sparkling Cider is priced unbelievably high at a $1.56. On the other hand the Chicken and Beef Burritos are generously priced at $2.60.

The Cafeteria is currently staffed by two career food services employees, but they have requested an additional server during peak hours to alleviate the great demand. Alejandro Najera has worked in nearly all the University dining facilities in his 18 years with Food Services. Sharon Paige has worked at USC for 11 years and finds her new position “comfortable.” Chris O’Brien expressed sympathy for the food servers even as he waited 25 minutes for a bagel. “The counter is obviously too wide for them. It must have been designed for gibbons. This thing is a horror. It’s a nightmare. Wake me up!”

Between the lockers and the cafeteria is the game area which currently offers four video games and two pinball machines. Jokerz, the first pinball game to arrive, appears to be the most popular. The high score shows a conspicuously even 5,000,000 by BSO. Originally fifty cents per game, the price has been lowered to a much more reasonable 25 cents. It is impossible to determine if law students achieve the high scores, but we have decided to publish them anyway. GRP is the king of Karate Champ with a high score of 61,000, RJK owns top honors with 763,380 on Sky Soldiers, and RCA managed 367,139 on Tetris.

Students have acclimated to their new surroundings with surprising speed. It took only minutes for everyone to recognize a major flaw. Because the restrooms open up on both sides, they make a convenient corridor from the hall to the locker area. Perhaps the designers realized that bathrooms would be used as hallways and so the as yet unfinished changing rooms on the restrooms have been numbered, as if classes were to be scheduled there.

Students have been less quick to notice the rear exit from the locker area which provides quick access to the library and the new classrooms on the first floor. It remains a mystery why there is a three foot gate blocking the continuation of the stairs on the first floor. Why is it necessary to go outside and reenter in order to continue up or down the staircase?

The journals and clinical programs have moved into their new accommodations. Located on the third floor are the Law Review, Computer/Tax Journal, Post-Conviction Justice Project and Poverty Law Clinic offices. Mary Ann Soden of Post-Conviction seemed very pleased with her new surroundings. Previously cooped up in one small room without windows the Project now shares an enormous light-filled room with the Poverty Law Clinic. There will plenty of room for eight computer terminals, bookshelves, carrels, and dividers for client interviewing spaces as well as plenty of plants to take advantage of the natural light. “We are no longer imprisoned in Post-Conviction,” exclaims Soden.

The Law Review offices don’t have the open, airy feeling that the Post-Conviction room exudes. The bookshelves are already lined with old journals and a touched-up poster of Mikhail Gorbachev stares down at staffers on tables that fill the common space. Although there are only four small offices for the editors, one less than previously, the new offices make much more efficient use of space. “It seems much more roomier,” says Ed Hagenrott, Managing Editor.

Apparently some Law Review staffers have expressed jealously over the Post-Conviction office, but Hagenrott is magnanimous in admitting that, “if anything, Post-Conviction got room they should have had before.” Soden had less compassion for the disgruntled Law Review staffers. “We are doing something real,” she argued. “People read what we write.”

The Computer/Tax Journal occupies the rooms next to the Law Review with a view toward the Coliseum and the giant billboard of L. Ron Hubbard. Editor-in-Chief Colleen Ryan is very pleased with the new accommodations. “It gives us the kind of space we need to get journals out on time,” says Ryan. The Journal did not have individual offices for editors before, and Ryan says she’s looking forward to getting some work done in her less cramped quarters. “Having to spend time in the old office there was a lot of commotion, and it was just harder to work,” she says.

The faculty are slowly moving into their new offices. Perhaps the unfinished look of the connecting corridors is making them apprehensive. The new dining/conference room on the eastern side of the new addition looks tremendous. What a difference from the unimpressive student lounge! The room offers a brilliant 225 degree view and fine blue carpeting. Adjoining the facility is a modern kitchen complete with a dishwasher.

Also worth noting are the new bathrooms on the fourth floor which include showers. In all of the new bathrooms there is one sink raised too high with tape around the pipes. Can someone please explain what this is for?

“Editorial: Two Immodest Proposals”

Law Street Journal Article (February 1990))

By Randol Schoenberg

Choosing courses is an iffy thing at best. There are a few important considerations such as bar courses, scheduling conflicts, draw time, final schedule, no Friday classes and last and least what you actually want to take. But perhaps the most important consideration is the professor. We all know that even the most exciting course can be made a bore by a bad professor and that the opposite is true as well. The professor determines the enjoyment of the course.

Unfortunately, we have little opportunity to evaluate the quality of professors before we enroll in their courses. Many people use the first few weeks of classes as a shopping period. They may end up with classes and professors they like, but they inevitably miss the introductory portions of some of their courses. Others who are unwilling to go through the hassle of changing schedules, stick it out in courses they dislike, often unaware that there are better alternatives.

An obvious solution to this problem is to make the objective portions of the course evaluations available to students. The faculty clearly would object to this system, fearing that certain professors’ feelings might be hurt if their low scores were made public but that isn’t the case for most undergraduate professors who not only face objective numerical evaluations but student-written course descriptions.

Students have a right to access information which they provide. By denying us the chance to use course evaluations in selecting our courses, the administration is obstructing an informed course selection process. Our educational experience undoubtedly suffers because of it.

***

Drab and dull describe the interior décor of the Law Center. The walls are white on white like a poor imitation of Kasimir Malevich. No self-respecting law firm would leave its halls as blank and unadorned as those in our law school. What we need is a little art to delight our senses and engage our minds as we walk the corridors and lounge in the wide open spaces of the new and improved law center, the cost of art these days! How does a small school struggling to make ends meet decorate?   Certainly we can’t expect $57 million to be shelled out for a Van Gogh to be displayed in the Dean’s Office. What can a poor law school do to show its love and appreciation for the arts?

The answer lies in what we have to offer—lots and lots of blank and empty space. There must be hundreds of student artists at USC who would love to exhibit their paintings if only there were a place to hang them. Why not ask the Art Department to decorate some of our walls?

Each semester the students in the art department could set up an exhibit on the walls, and in the open spaces of the law center. Paintings or sculptures that are particularly good or well-received could be donated or loaned to the law school indefinitely. Over a period of years, the law school could establish quite a nice collection from USC student artists.

“The Library: A Critical Review”

Law Street Journal Article (November ’89)

By Randol Schoenberg

“The library is like a like a rat’s maze,” Chris O’Brien announced, “but I can’t find the cheese!” Similar comments were heard throughout the Law Center as students explored the long anticipated new wing of the library. “I feel like Theseus in the Labyrinth trying to find the Minotaur,” suggested Greg McCambridge.

The opening was not as smooth as some had hoped, but no one complained too loudly for fear that they would close it up again. Students look to the positive. The new carpet, an industrial dark grey (light grey in some places) with splotches of blue, white, yellow and red, receive the most notice. The carpeting is great,” said Don Morrissey, “best I’ve seen in a library!”

Karen Feld was also full of praise for the new library, “I love it. There’s the beautiful new carpet. It’s well organized and I like the design, although it’s kind of hard to find the exit once in a while.”

One would expect confusion when students are asked to find their way around the new facility. The problems are compounded by the temporary entrance, which is designed as an emergency fire escape. The path to the library is disorienting, entailing a short walk outside the law center building the helpful arrows and red ribbons can’t disguise the awkwardness. “I feel like I’m walking in the back door,” stated Phil Kohler upon passing through the entrance conspicuously marked ‘law library’.

Once inside, patients confront a naked hallway which must be navigated correctly in order to reach the first book. Even the library staffer manning the desk at the entrance admits she can’t find her way around. She’s not alone. An exasperated Maggie Wolfe, formerly a professional librarian, exclaims sardonically, “I am utterly speechless with the beauty and integrity of the planning. I know there’s got to be a book in here somewhere!”

As for the design, it fails to impress the architect broke no new ground with this addition. The concrete outer façade is hardly distinguishable from an army bunker, only partly embellished with a curve here or there and a glass entrance which invokes the stark simplicity of the Bauhaus but without the panache. Inside, the space is functional if not inspiring. Carrels line the glass walls of the library, with those on the northern side featuring a nice view down to Town and Gown. The southern side promises the most sun, and the third floor study area at the top of the stairs is already a popular hangout. The restrooms on the second floor are spacious and well-lit, perfect for ‘throne’ reading. With a small desk, the handicapped stall would make a nice carrel. However, the new ‘push-on’ faucets are pretty awful. And why is one sink in the Men’s room raised so high that the faucet nearly touches the paper towel ledge?

The photocopy room is nice and well-placed. The new copiers are fast and high-quality. John Douglas agrees, “The new copiers are delightful. I don’t have to go to Southwestern anymore.” But he pointed out that the new machines don’t have the capability to reduce or enlarge. Reduction can make copying books much more economical because it allows pages to be copied two at a time. There are three copiers in the new room with space for two more. An additional machine is located by the reference desk.

The third floor is made for adventure. The door from the stairway is heavy and makes a loud sound when it shuts, announcing your entrance to all the inhabitants. The compact shelves look as inviting as the passage between Scylla and Charybdis. Red lights indicate when the safety sweep is in order (or not in order?), and every five seconds, something beeps. Apparently, the flap at the bottom of the shelves (the safety sweep) will stop the aisles from moving if they come up against something or someone, but who will volunteer to test it?

The computer lab was moved without too much difficulty, but only 6 of 8 IBM terminals are currently operational. The new computers for the new lab have arrived already but because of space restrictions, hardware and security complications, these computers will sit idle in storage until the entire library is completed. Too bad.

Vice Dean Jerry Wiley has said that the next order of business is the student lounge area in the basement. New lockers should be installed any day now, but the kitchen is causing the most problems. The Life Safety Inspector—the same guy who delayed the opening of the library for two months—has objected to the design of the new kitchen, which is positioned in the middle of the lounge area. No estimate is available for when the lounge will be operational.

Wiley, who is supervising the construction project from the Law Center, was peppered with questions during a ‘Construction Forum’ on Thursday, October 19. Most of the problems, according to Wiley, are the fault of University administration and not the fault of anyone in the Law Center,” Wiley explained. “We never got to see the contract before it was signed. The USC vice president wrote and approved the contract without even showing it to us,” said Wiley, noting also that there were a few people in the Law Center who have experience with contracts.

The Administration continues to be optimistic about the completion date of the project, however. The faculty lounge is scheduled to be the final project. Opening ceremonies are scheduled for March 1990.

“Editorial: Pro Bono Thoughts & Other Good things”

Law Street Journal Article (November ’89)

By Randol Schoenberg

Last month a member of the federal judiciary was invited to USC to speak about the legal profession. The recurring theme of Judge Harry Edwards’ talk was today’s students’ lack of interest in pro bono work. I think I wasn’t alone in feeling a bit uncomfortable being harangued for something I hadn’t had the opportunity to do or not do. Judge Edwards’ lecture should have been directed at practicing lawyers but perhaps it would have fallen on deaf ears.

Surprisingly, the faculty—including the three panelists, Professors Chemerinsky, Craswell and Estrich—were also subjected to Judge Edwards’ harsh criticism. Students are not taught to think about pro bono work he said. No one even asks about it in interviews anymore. Whether right or wrong about the questions students ask, he certainly correct that the faculty while exhorting students to commit time to pro bono projects, and regardless of their own personal commitments, could do much more to instill a feeling of responsibility in the student body.

Most of what we hear about pro bono work as students comes in the form of pleas, jokes, and concerned looks. The truth is that the Law Center itself is not visibly committed to pro bono. Outside of a few clinical classes and sporadic activities by student groups, there are no pro bono activities available for students in the Law Center.

Why do we have to get a job in Century City before we can begin serving the legally underserved? Certainly, there are plenty of needy people right where we are now. Nowhere would it be easier to give help to the community than on the campus of USC.

Is there no room for a legal aid clinic in the Law Center? The Law Center has just expanded to nearly double its former size. A clinic on campus would be the most efficient way for the faculty to practice what they preach. Students could easily become involved in legal work in the new clinic, and all students would benefit from the good example such a clinic would set.

The administrative response to such a proposal is that the costs of such a clinic are too great. There’s no room. Insurance costs too much. We can’t afford the extra staff. But pro bono work always costs the donor. The only question is whether the law center community is willing to incur those costs.

The benefits in terms of community relations, publicity, and national reputation should offset the costs of an on-campus legal aid clinic. If the faculty really wants to instill service values, professors should demand the creation of such a clinic. Otherwise the lip service they give to pro bono work will continue to sound just like empty words.

“Construction! Construction! Construction! Construction to Enter Final Stage”

Law Street Journal Article (10/6/89)

By Randol Schoenberg

The new addition to the law school is expected to be opened up this month—that is if the building passes the upcoming safety inspection. The life safety inspector has already flunked the new building twice, further delaying the 16-month-old construction project, but hopes are high that the third time will be a charm for the Continental Heller Corporation which is overseeing the $9.4 million dollar construction project.

What students will find beyond the blocked passages is a new structure nearly equal in size to the current law school building.

Beginning in the basement, the new addition houses an expansive student lounge, complete with a cafeteria and dressing rooms. There’s space for new lockers too, but due to a mix-up in the University’s procurement office they will only be arriving at the end of this month.

The changing rooms will be the most significant difference from the old student’s lounge, which is now only a faded memory to the third years who once relaxed in it. Vice Dean Jerry Wiley, who is supervising the construction project, says, “the rooms will have benches and mirrors, but beyond that, I’m not confident that I know what to put in those rooms.”

Wiley hopes that students will let him know what they want in the lounge and changing rooms. Just last week someone suggested a make-up table for the women’s dressing room. “We’ve had a building committee for five years and no one had ever suggested a make-up table,” Wiley added somewhat amused. “I think there will be a number of things we’ll identify only after we move in.”

The cafeteria will take the place of the food truck which has been positioned outside the building since 1988. An unconfirmed rumor has it that Fanny, who ably manned the truck last year but has since been relegated to Carl’s Jr., will return to head the new food facility.

The ground floor addition sports two new side entrances and a large foyer. The offices will be playing musical chairs, with the Placement Office and Student Services (102) being moved back to the new wing and the soon-to-be remodeled Deans’ Offices. The Continuing Education Program will move into what is now the Placement Office, and Development and Alumni Affairs will leave their enclaves in Town & Gown for refurbished accommodations in Room 102. The Deans will be moving upstairs to a new suite of offices on the third floor.

The library will be entering a temporary phase, moving completely into the new area so that the old library space can be remodeled. During the interim period entrance to the library will be from the stairs and elevator in the new ground floor lobby.

The arrival of compact shelving on the third floor is sure to attract the most notice from students. According to Dean of the Library Professor Albert Brecht, compact shelving is not a novel idea, but is used to conserve space in a number of libraries including Loyola and Notre Dame Law School. The new shelves will hold 100,000 books, or two sevenths of the Library’s 350,000 book capacity, but will take up relatively little of the 10,000 library floor space.

Compact shelves are stacked one next to the other without any place in between. When a student wants a book he must create an aisle by sliding the shelves apart, a task made possible by a delicate track system which makes the massive shelves glide with very little effort. An electric sweep on the floor of the shelves protects those inside the aisles from being accidentally crushed between the shelves.

Because the compact shelves are manually operated, it may take some time for students to learn which knobs to pull and which wheels to crank in order to gain access to the books they want. Fortunately, the new shelves will house primarily lesser used books, old books and duplicates. During the interim period, however, the compact shelves are filled with some books which will eventually be moved back to the refurbished old library.

The old library will be entirely closed off on both the second and third floors for another three to four months in order to complete remodeling. The work to be done includes carpeting the floors, building a staircase that will be used for access between the library’s two floors, and creating a separate Deans’ Office Suite on the third floor.

Although the library staff will be working in temporarily stations, the library should appear completely operational to students. Nearly all the 240,000 were moved into the new area over the summer and will be directly accessible. 30,000 volumes will remain in storage until the entire library is finally completed in January or February.

The new addition to the library includes 50 additional seats, not including the computer lab, computer classroom, and Lexis-Westlaw room. The computer lab will offer 25 personal computers with 18 more PC’s in the class room. There will be 10-12 Lexis-Westlaw terminals. The computers will be primarily IBMs, which means that many students will have to continue using the business school’s Macintosh facilities to print out their work. Professor Brecht notes that “90% of all law firms use IBM compatible machines. Therefore, because law firms are so heavily into IBM we feel we need to have more IBMs. We’d be a disservice if we had only Macs.”

The new carpet was installed at the request of the students. It should provide for a quieter and warmer studying environment. The main drawback is that the library may need a new policy on food and drink because carpet is more difficult to clean. Brecht says he would like to have student input on the scope of the new rules.

The old circulation desk is being converted into a casual reading room for current newspapers and periodicals, relieving the overcrowding of Campbell Lounge. The temporary circulation area in the new library will eventually be an open reserve room, where students will be able to have direct access to items currently held behind the circulation desk. During the interim period, library acquisitions will be using the future computer lab, and the old lab will be temporarily placed in the new computer classroom. The temporary location of the card catalogue is actually planned to be a future study area, taking advantage of some windows on the south side of the new building.

A number of rooms for the east end of the library will house the offices of the Law Review and Computer Tax Journal, as well as new offices for legal writing instructors. The initial design has been altered at the students’ requests this year at an additional cost of $25,000. Offices on the south end of the new addition will temporarily house library staff and will be used for library projects.

Members of the faculty are eagerly anticipating the opening of the new fourth floor offices. Six faculty members who are now located in Hancock Hall and the few professors who reside on the third floor alcove, will all move into offices on the expanded fourth floor. Wiley expects most of the moves to occur after the end of the semester.

The stairs down to the third floor offices on the northwest corner of the building will be eliminated and that area will be combined with part of the old library to create a spacious Deans’ Office suite, which will be accessible from the old elevator. The library will not be connected to the Dean’s suite.

Both Wiley and Brecht have nothing but praise for the patience of the students through the ordeal of construction. “Everyone seems good humored,” says Wiley, “but they may just be cussing me behind my back—that’s why I wear a hard hat.”

Construction should last for another three to four months although the contractor still says November. Wiley is very optimistic: “My worst fear is February; my hope is December.”